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4EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Village treasury lands (tanah kas desa) originate from the colonial era and usually comprise a 
few hectares that remain under the control of the village government. Village Law No. 6/2014 
allows villages to manage their own assets, including village treasury lands, for common welfare 
and the benefit of the most vulnerable groups of the village. Ministry of Home Affairs Regulation 
1/2016 stipulates three relevant formats of village land use: rental, cooperation in joint ventures, 
and Build Operate Transfer/Build Transfer Operate (BOT/BTO).
Land is a strategic resource on the Indonesian island of Java, which has a large rural population. 
The most common plot sizes for farmland are small and can hardly sustain the lives of their 
owners and are increasingly transformed to serve industrial and infrastructure purposes. For 
this reason, ensuring the optimal use of village treasury lands is an important policy objective.
Sidomulyo and Bonorowo Villages in Kebumen District have applied the rental format for their 
village land and leased the land to poor farming households. Tlogojati and Beran Villages in 
Wonosobo District engaged in business cooperation, while villagers in Sukoharjo Village in 
Wonosobo District applied the BOT format when building and operating a local market.
A comparative analysis of experiences in these five villages showed that the rental to farmers 
in Sidomulyo and Bonorowo provides the lowest gross income to the leaseholders—between 
IDR 2.6 and 2.8 million per year, from which input costs, rental fees, and labor fees must still be 
subtracted. Incomes from the cooperation with a tea plantation in Tlogojati provided as much as 
three times the income, and small businesses in Beran provided the village with over 20 times 
the income of leaseholders.
It is therefore recommended that restrictive Articles 14–16 of MoHA Regulation 1/2016, which 
stipulate that cooperation in joint ventures and BOT/BTO models can only be considered 
when village budgets are insufficient, be dropped. Instead, the regulation should introduce a 
new paradigm for village treasury land utilization: encouraging village entrepreneurship. 
Entrepreneurship efforts might also involve a role for the private sector, especially when the 
scale of business exceeds the resources owned by a single village.
5CURRENT SITUATION
A. Land Affairs for Agricultural Workers in Indonesia
For many Indonesians living in villages and working in the agricultural sector, 
access to land is considered instrumental to their wellbeing. Many studies have 
been written about the importance of land distribution to improving the wellbeing 
of agricultural workers (e.g., Syahyuti, 2001; Sucianti, 2004; Isnaeni, 2017). 
These studies generally conclude that the distribution of land in rural areas is 
imbalanced and there is a need to redistribute lands. However, redistribution 
must not reduce the average size of land plots owned by individual farmers 
because a majority of Indonesian farmers own small plots of land and at least 
0.65 ha is required to stay above the poverty line (Susilowati et al., 2010).
According to Statistics Indonesia (2018), of the 12,998,899 agricultural workers 
in Indonesia, 9,869,797 own less than 0.5 ha of land, while about 1,996,580 own 
0.5–1.0 ha of land. In other words, 91.3% of agricultural workers in Indonesia 
own less than 1.0 ha of land. A significant number of farming households in 
Indonesia are living in poverty or near poverty.
Figure 1. 
Farming households (millions) and area of land owned (ha) in 2013
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6Agricultural land area has declined from almost 40 million ha in 2010 to 37.1 million in 2017. 
This reduction has been especially acute in Java, which has 44% of Indonesia’s total rice-
planting land (3.4 million ha of 7.74 million ha) (Lestari, 2017). Large areas of agricultural land 
have disappeared as they were repurposed for the development of infrastructure: toll roads, 
industrial, commercial, and residential areas (Davidson, 2015). For example, in the District of 
Bekasi, agricultural land area has declined from 52,000 ha in 2014 to 48,000 ha in 2017 due to 
both industrialization and the construction of residential areas (Lestari, 2017). 
Figure 2. 
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B. Feasibility of Village Land Utilization
Since it is a finite resource, any land that can be used to the greatest benefit of the most vulnerable 
groups in the village is considered useful in improving their economic conditions. Village treasury 
land is one possible source for improvement. The question is how to utilize village treasury lands 
to yield the greatest benefit for the neediest segments of the village population.
Communal lands have existed since the forced plantation era under Dutch colonization, during 
which land boundaries in the villages were drawn not based on village needs but to facilitate 
colonial taxation (Syahyuti, 2016, p. 24). Initially, families who pioneered the settlement of the 
villages (cutting the trees and opening farms) had a right to their lands as individual property. 
Lands that were not claimed were owned by the village and leased to farm workers. There were 
three types of village land leases: lands whose yields were given to village officials as a form of 
salary, called tanah bengkok; lands loaned to former village officials as a form of pension, called 
tanah pengarem-arem; and lands whose yields were given to the village for development, called 
tanah kas desa (Alexander and Alexander, 1982, p. 604).
7This scheme has survived to the present day, although in many cases, tanah bengkok and tanah 
pengarem-arem have changed ownership to become ‘personal property’ of the former officials (see 
for example Edi, 2010). However, tanah kas desa, which tend to be less fertile than the two other 
types of village lands, remain under the control of the village.  
Village treasury lands are generally used by landless farmers who lease them from the village, 
for which they pay a rental fee to the village, and farm with the help of farm workers. The average 
lease payment for village treasury lands is smaller than what is paid by farmers at prevailing 
market rates (Harahap and Ambarwati, 2015, p. 16). In this scheme, both parties are expected to 
gain benefits since the village generates income to put toward village development and farmers 
spend less on renting the land than they would renting from other farmers. 
However, this scheme has not been especially successful at raising the living conditions of villagers 
working on these lands. Despite the relatively small rental fee, the limited land area means that 
villagers produce only subsistence levels of crops (Syuaib, 2016, pp.170-171). Further, the number 
of landless farmers is higher than the available village treasury lands will support, so not all 
landless farmers and farm workers can obtain land or work from this scheme. Land is usually 
distributed through an auction and landless farmers and farm workers are often unable to win 
bids for the plots (Harahap and Ambarwati, 2015, pp. 16-17). Given these shortcomings, how village 
treasury lands can provide the greatest good for the villagers, especially those lacking access to 
land needs to be reassessed.
8EXISTING POLICIES
A. Village Law 6/2014
In 2014, Indonesia introduced its new Village Law (Law 6/2014), which increased the freedom 
of villages to manage their own affairs, including the freedom to manage village treasury lands 
and other assets. Article 4 of Law 6/2014 mentions that village assets are to be developed ‘for 
common welfare,’ which provides a legal basis for policies that benefit the most vulnerable 
groups of the village.
Further, Article 77(1) stipulates the following principles in the management of village assets need 
to be met. It must: serve the public good (based on society’s interests), be functional (complying 
with functions, authorities, and responsibilities of the village government), be in line with legality, 
transparency, efficiency, accountability, and certainty of value (accuracy of planning) (Sutaryono 
et al., 2014, pp. 34-35).
B. MoHA Regulation 1/2016
The Management of Village Assets section in MoHA Regulation 1/2016 further operationalized 
the Village Law 6/2014. Village treasury lands are mentioned as one form of village assets in 
Article 2(2), and the management principles above are repeated in Article 3. Article 11 of the 
regulation stipulates four formats for village asset utilization, three of which are relevant to 
land assets: rental, cooperation, and Build Operate Transfer/Build Transfer Operate (BOT/BTO). 
Villagers rent a plot of land for cropping under the rental scheme, which is the most common use 
of village treasury lands. 
Under cooperation, the village forms a joint venture with a third party such as a village 
government enterprise (BUMDes) or private enterprise. The BUMDes is regulated in MOVDRT 
4/2015 and defined as a “business enterprise whose ownership in its entirety or majority lies 
with the village… to manage assets, services and other businesses for the greatest welfare of 
the village community.”
The BOT/BTO scheme enables transfer of ownership from the owner to the village after the 
facility built through the scheme has been used for a 20-year period. These different formats are 
described in Articles 12, 14, 15, and 16. The following matrix shows the characteristics of each 
format:
9Table 1.
Village Treasury Land Utilization Schemes 
Rental
(Art. 12)
Cooperation or Joint Venture
(Art. 14)
BOT/BTO 
(Arts. 15 and 16)
Maximum
length of term
Prerequisite
Obligations
20 years, extendable. Upon 
extension, stipulations in Art. 
14  apply
15 years, extendable3 years, extendable 
Can only be enacted if village 
budget is inadequate to build 
the facility on the land and the 
facility is necessary for the 
village 
None
Further regulated in lower 
(district/village) 
regulations 
Annual contribution and 
maintenance of facility. 
Ownership of the facility goes 
to the village at the end of the 
term (BOT) or upon 
completion (BTO)
Source: MoHA Regulation 1/2016
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RESEARCH FINDINGS
A number of recent studies have examined how village assets are used (Setiawan, 2015; Dewi, 
2017; Pratopo, 2017; Swasto, 2012). These studies tend to be critical of village treasury land 
management finding that it does not bring benefits to the village. In Batang Batindih village in 
Kampar District, the village treasury lands were rented out as palm oil plantations and fishponds 
(Setiawan, 2015, pp. 6-9), but this failed because many villagers did not pay the rental fees. In 
another study of Banjar Panjang Village in Pelalawan District, the authors identified a lack of 
capable human resources and infrastructure in the village government, which interfered with 
effective management of village treasury lands (Pratopo, 2017). In Kandangan Village in Ngawi 
District, the village treasury lands were distributed only to family members of the village officials 
(Dewi, 2017, pp. 8-10) despite the use of an auction system to allocate the rights to use the land. 
However, there are also success stories. In Sleman District, village treasury lands were used for 
building low-cost flats (Swasto, 2012). In Sumberharjo Village, also in Sleman District, village 
treasury lands were used to develop a ‘tourist village’ managed by a BUMDes (Nugroho, 2017).
In order to provide a comparison of the practices to achieve the most productive utilization of 
village treasury land, CIPS researchers conducted field research in five villages in Central Java 
in 2019. The results are described below.
A. Case 1: Deliberative Rental Scheme
Two villages in Kebumen District, Sidomulyo and Bonorowo, adopted the rental model through 
deliberative processes that take into account the local context and experiences of villagers. 
The village of Sidomulyo has 3,627 ubin,1 or 5.1 ha, of village treasury lands divided into 73 
plots. The plots are leased to households on a rotation system, rather than through an auction. 
Households that had taken their turn to work the plots in a given year are unable to participate 
in the next year.
The deliberation process to determine the rental fees for the plots, which vary according to 
the fertility of the soil and the terms for the payment of the rental fee, is conducted publicly. In 
January 2019, the rental fees for the plots varied from about IDR 15,000/ubin for less fertile plots 
to IDR 25,000/ubin for more fertile ones. In contrast, the typical commercial rental price is IDR 
40,000/ubin. A lottery is conducted to assign each plot to registered participants. An organizer 
records the information about each plot on a slip of paper, folds the papers, puts them into a 
jar, then draws plots to be assigned to each name until all plots are assigned (Interview with 
Nasimin, head of village, 2019).
1Ubin is a unit equivalent to 14 m2. One hectare is equal to 711 ubin. 
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Working on plots between 27 and 77 ubin, a leaseholder is able to produce 
0.5–0.9 tons of rice every year (assuming two harvests in a year). If all the 
rice harvested during the year is sold, the selling price ranges between 
IDR 2 million and 3.6 million per year (Interviews with Dariyo, Sakir and 
Samiyasa, leaseholders, 2019). However, land rental fees range between 
IDR 405,000 and IDR 1,925,000, and production inputs including wages of 
laborers must be subtracted from this amount. This leaves a leaseholder 
with less than IDR 1.6 million annually, which is not enough to support them, 
so villagers have to work as caping (traditional conical hat) makers, earning 
as much as an additional to IDR 7.2 million per year.
While Sidomulyo is concerned with equality of opportunity to access village 
treasury lands, Bonorowo emphasizes equity of outcome, giving access 
to land for those who need it most. Bonorowo has 1.13 ha of ‘prosperity 
lands’ allocated for the poor. The village government selects land access 
recipients based on several indicators of poverty: lack of land ownership, low 
income, lack of additional income from other family members, and ability or 
willingness to work the land. Unlike in Sidomulyo, the land can be assigned to the same person 
for multiple years in succession. According to the head of the village, some villagers complain of 
feeling left out from the process. These complaints are resolved through deliberations, in which 
the complainant was given the right to work the land in the following year. 
For each ubin, the rental fee is IDR 10,000 to IDR 20,000 per year, depending on the fertility of 
the plots. This is less than half the normal market price of IDR 40,000–50,000. The term for the 
payment of rent is also flexible, either through installments or in full after the harvest (Interview 
with Purnomo, head of Bonorowo village, 2019). In a given year, each of the plots produces 
between 0.5 and 0.8 tons of rice, giving the leaseholder a gross income of IDR 2 million to 3.2 
million, but after subtracting the rental fees, inputs and labor wages, net income is only IDR 
250,000 to IDR 1,000,000 (Interviews with Sumarto, Maniso and Karyo, leaseholders, 2019).
This leaves a 
leaseholder with less 
than IDR 1.6 million 
annually, which is not 
enough to support them, 
so villagers have to work 
as caping (traditional 
conical hat) makers, 
earning as much as an 
additional to IDR 7.2 
million per year.
In a given year, each of the plots produces between 0.5 and 0.8 
tons of rice, giving the leaseholder a gross income of IDR 2 million 
to 3.2 million, but after subtracting the rental fees, inputs and labor 
wages, net income is only IDR 250,000 to IDR 1,000,000
(Interviews with Sumarto, Maniso and Karyo, leaseholders, 2019).
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B. Case 2: Cooperation between the Village and Private Enterprises
Case 1 involves only individual households, but two villages in Wonosobo District, Tlogojati and 
Beran, optimized the use of village resources by seeking cooperation between the villages and 
private enterprises.
Tlogojati has 16.29 ha of village treasury lands, all of which are leased to PT Tambi, a tea 
plantation company, for plantation and agrotourism purposes. The lands are located on 
the slopes of Mt. Sumbing and are suitable for tea and horticulture. Tea trees benefit 
the region by preventing erosion and landslides on the lower slopes of the mountain 
(Interview with Wibowo, director of PT Tambi, 2019). 
The lease agreement between PT Tambi and Tlogojati village used to be for a period of 
seven years. The latest lease agreement was signed in 2012 and will expire in December 
2019. Due to the enactment of MoHA 1/2016, the extension for the lease is being 
renegotiated into a cooperation scheme with a 15-year lease. If the draft agreement 
is ratified, the village will receive 22.5% of the profits from the tea plantation on the 
village treasury land and the village will gain from the use of 3 ha of village treasury 
lands for agrotourism.
The renegotiation process brought to light previously undetected corruption of a 
former head of Tlogojati village. In that lease period, the village government received 
no record of rental payments from PT Tambi, and the company made payments through this 
village official (interviews with Wayan, head of village, and Wibowo, director of PT Tambi, 2019). 
PT Tambi employs about 600 people from 20 villages, half of whom are tea pickers. There are 10 
tea pickers from Tlogojati who make between IDR 4.5 million and 12 million per year. In addition, 
the workers receive an IDR 1 million annual bonus, BPJS health insurance, death allowance, and 
in-kind benefits such as food and cash (interviews with Mungadhim, Supandi and Urip, villagers, 
2019).
Beran has 1.2 ha of village treasury lands which are used by a village government enterprise 
named BUMDes Silatri Indah. Silatri Indah was formed in 2013 following the enactment of Village 
Regulation 4/2013. It operates a rest area next to the Wonosobo-Magelang road and includes a 
minimarket, a shop, stalls, a swimming pool, an educational rice field for children, toilets, and a 
joglo hall for holding meetings and events. These facilities generate income for the BUMDes. In 
addition, 16 BUMDes partners rent stalls for their businesses, generating an annual income of 
IDR 17.5 million to 105 million (Interviews with Aziz, Ros and Waluni, BUMDes partners, 2019), 
and contributing IDR 43 million to the BUMDes in rental payments.
In 2017, the total revenue of the BUMDes was IDR 210 million (Silatri Indah, 2018), with a profit of 
IDR 64 million, 50% of which went to the village as budget revenues, 20% was added to BUMDes 
capital, and 30% was distributed as shared dividends (Interview with Akhmat, BUMDes director, 
2019). Villagers directly employed by the BUMDes received an annual salary of IDR 12 million, 
plus shared dividends.
The village will 
receive 22.5% of 
the profits from the 
tea plantation on 
the village treasury 
land and the village 
will gain from the 
use of 3 ha of village 
treasury lands for 
agrotourism.
Villagers directly employed by the BUMDes received an annual 
salary of IDR 12 million, plus shared dividends.
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C. Case 3: Villager-Owned Market
Sukoharjo Village of Wonosobo District has three businesses on its village treasury lands: a fruit 
plantation and a village sports hall, both managed by a BUMDes, and a market managed by 
the villagers in a main market building and kiosks. The market stands on a 0.8 ha plot and was 
constructed through a BOT scheme. 
Each of the market’s 27 stalls has a different owner and all owners are Sukoharjo villagers. Each 
owner contributes IDR 51 million to the construction cost of their stall, of which IDR 25 million is 
paid as a down payment and the rest is financed through a bank loan. The stall owners can use 
the stalls for a 20-year period, after which ownership will be transferred to the village. The stall 
owners also have to pay an annual fee of IDR 500,000 (Interview with Samain, former village 
head, 2019).
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ANALYSIS
Different ways of utilizing village treasury land and to applying principles of village asset 
management lead to different benefits for the villagers.
A. Implementation of Village Asset Management Principles
As mentioned above, Article 77(1) of Law 6/2014 stipulates the following principles for managing 
village assets: public good, functionality, legality, transparency, efficiency, accountability, and 
certainty of value. 
Despite their different implementation models, all villages seek to apply the village asset 
management principles to their village treasury lands regardless whether the lands are rented 
directly to villagers (Sidomulyo and Bonorowo), leased to a company (Tlogojati), managed by a 
BUMDes (Beran) or by a group of villagers (Sukoharjo). The village treasury lands are managed 
for the interests of the society (public good), especially in the interest of those who are expected to 
gain the most from use of the land. This is especially apparent in Sidomulyo, where the lands are 
distributed on an equal opportunity basis, and in Bonorowo, which focused on land distribution 
for the landless.
The functional principle is observed in all villages, as the village government (usually, the head 
of the village) has the authority and responsibility to make decisions regarding 
the utilization they consider most appropriate for their village. The Village 
Deliberations Council (BPD: Badan Permusyawaratan Desa) is a consultative body 
with oversight of village governance. BPD is responsible for village development 
planning, cooperation involving the village, and formation of BUMDes (Article 38 
of MoHA Regulation 110/2016), as well as arranging village deliberation meetings 
(Musrenbangdes) (Article 88(1) of Village Law 6/2014), which can encourage 
development initiatives from villagers. CIPS research found that BPD was active in 
Beran and Sukoharjo through village deliberations in the founding of the BUMDes. 
These deliberations ensure that the village is included in decisions about the use 
of treasury lands and decision making is not made only by the executive (head of 
village).  
The contracts used in cooperation schemes can be more formal in nature (such as 
the contract with PT Tambi in Tlogojati village), or simpler, less formal agreements 
with individual leaseholders. While the presence of written contracts does not 
necessarily ensure that the terms will be fulfilled (as in the case of Tlogojati), it 
provides a level of legal certainty, transparency, and accountability. In Sidomulyo, the 
lottery process ensures a high level of transparency, since all villagers are allowed 
to participate in the lottery event. Similarly, where there are village deliberations, 
as in Beran and Sukoharjo, also increase transparency in the deliberations process.
Poor transparency and accountability were found in the management of Tlogojati village 
treasury land. Although PT Tambi, the company leasing the village land, had signed a contract 
 CIPS research 
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with the village government, the previous head of village pocketed the rental 
fees in previous lease periods. As a result, the village did not enjoy budgetary 
revenues. It is expected that in the next term of lease agreement, which is to 
begin in December 2019, the village will have more control over the transaction 
and the villagers will benefit.
B. Comparison of Village Treasury Land Utilization 
Schemes
In general, regardless of which utilization scheme they lived with, villagers 
were satisfied with the scheme used in their village. Villagers feel that the 
schemes are fair and when complaints arose they could immediately be 
resolved without escalating to conflict (Interview with Purnomo, head of 
Bonorowo village, 2019).
Table 2 compares the additional revenues gained by households through 
the utilization of village treasury lands and shows information about the 
beneficiaries (i.e., people directly employed on the village treasury lands), 
the total village revenues from the utilization schemes, and the revenues of 
each beneficiary.
Table 2.
Impact of Village Treasury Land Utilization
Sukoharjo 27 stall owners 0.8 13,500,000 n/a
Gross annual 
revenues of each 
beneficiary (IDR)
Total village
revenue (IDR)
Treasury land 
area (ha)
Village
beneficiaries
FormatVillage
Sidomulyo
Bonorowo
Rental
BOT
73 households
12 households 1.13
5.1 72,500,000
12,500,000 2,600,000
2,800,000
Tlogojati
Beran
Joint 
venture
10 tea pickers
15 employees
16 partners  
1.2
16.29
64,000,000
12,000,000
61,250,000
8,250,000Confidential 2
Source: compiled and calculated from interview results
Table 2 shows that Sidomulyo village has the highest number of direct beneficiaries at 73 households, 
while Tlogojati has the lowest, with only 10 persons employed as tea pickers. However, this figure is 
not much different from that of Bonorowo, which only has 12 household beneficiaries. The number 
of people benefiting from utilization schemes in Beran and Sukoharjo are likely to be higher because 
BUMDes partners and stall owners may employ other villagers as shopkeepers or assistants.
2The company leases 16.29 ha of land, and assuming a rental fee of IDR 5,000,000 per hectare, the village should receive about IDR 
81,450,000 annually. Additionally, 22.5% of the company’s profits go to the village (Interview with Wibowo, head of village, 2019). 
Although PT Tambi, the 
company leasing the 
village land, had signed 
a contract with the 
village government, the 
previous head of village 
pocketed the rental 
fees in previous lease 
periods. As a result, the 
village did not enjoy 
budgetary revenues.
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It is interesting to compare the revenues received by each village. Beran Village has the highest 
ratio of revenue to area, with IDR 53.3 million per ha of land. Farmers in other villages receive 
between IDR 11–16 million per hectare of land. This means that utilization of village treasury 
lands is a valuable source of additional revenues for the village, regardless of the format.
The rental schemes in Sidomulyo and Bonorowo generate the least gross income for 
leaseholders—between IDR 2.6 to 2.8 million—from which input costs, rental fees and labor fees 
must be subtracted. However, the direct rental scheme does provide leaseholders with rice for 
consumption. Despite these meager monetary gains, villagers expressed their satisfaction with 
the existing scheme (Interviews with Dariyo, Sakir and Samiyasa in Sidomulyo, and Sumarto, 
Maniso and Karyo in Bonorowo, leaseholders, 2019). 
A strictly economic evaluation of the village treasury land utilization schemes might consider 
the rental scheme to have failed to bring prosperity, but, meaning that all villagers are given the 
opportunity to work on lands and produce crops, regardless of the actual financial benefits, may 
also be an important measure for consideration.
Regardless, the rental scheme yields the lowest income for the beneficiaries. The tea pickers 
of Tlogojati receive as much as three times the income of leaseholders, not including bonuses, 
insurance, and other employment benefits (Interviews with Mungadhim, Supandi and Urip, tea 
pickers, 2019). And BUMDes partners in Beran gain over twenty times the income of leaseholders. 
C. Rural Entrepreneurship and Role of the Private Sector
Simply defined, entrepreneurship means opening new economic avenues where there were 
none previously. In villages with schemes that involve entrepreneurial efforts seem to generate 
more income. In Beran and Sukoharjo, we found cases where villagers actively made efforts to 
make better economic use of village treasury lands. 
In Beran, the initiative to build the rest area came from Akhmat, Febby, and Aris, who later become 
the leader, administrative director, and treasurer of the BUMDes after being approached by the 
village government to create a BUMDes to operate the rest area (Interview with Akhmat, BUMDes 
director, 2019). Recall that the BUMDes contributes a significant amount to village revenue in 
addition to generating income for villagers working as employees and BUMDes partners.  
In Sukoharjo, construction of the market was pioneered by a group of villagers who were 
unsatisfied with the existing marketplace, which had consisted of a collection of stalls located 
on the side of a road. These villagers reported their aspiration in a village deliberation meeting, 
requesting that the market be moved and properly regulated. These villagers contributed their 
own money and took loans to construct the market, creating economic opportunities and growth 
in the village. 
In Sidomulyo and Bonorowo, where there is lack of entrepreneurship (i.e., the villagers feel 
satisfied with existing systems, which have been in place for generations), villagers have to 
settle with much lower levels of income as the schemes are much less economically successful. 
Employment in the agricultural sector, which the schemes support, simply cannot be depended 
upon to provide adequate levels of income, at least on the limited village treasury lands. In 
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Sidomulyo, the main source of income is the manufacturing sector and 
farming on village treasury lands provide only supplementary income. There 
is a need for entrepreneurship efforts and changes to other sectors.
The private sector also plays a role in the economic development of the 
villages through the use of village treasury lands. It has the potential 
to develop the economy in villages that lack the required capital, both 
financial and human, for initiatives on village treasury lands. The PT Tambi 
tea plantation in Tlogojati and several neighboring villages is a larger 
undertaking than these villages could muster. With a poverty rate of 46.69% 
(SMERU, 2013), it is understandable that schemes to increase utilization of 
Tlogojati village treasury lands may not be able to depend entirely on local 
initiatives and resources.
D. Recommendations for regulatory reform
MoHA Regulation 1/2016 on the Management of Village Assets, which 
regulates the use of village treasury lands, allows a range of schemes for village treasury land 
utilization. Articles 14–16 of this regulation set the prerequisites for joint ventures and BOT/BTO 
models and require ‘inadequacy of village budget’ as a prerequisite for the joint venture and BOT/
BOT models. This is unnecessarily restrictive. 
Instead, MoHA Regulation 1/2016 should be revised to introduce a new paradigm of village 
treasury land utilization by encouraging village entrepreneurship. This can be done by 
making village development deliberation meetings (Musrenbangdes) the forum for submitting 
entrepreneurship ideas to the village community, ensuring that any development plan is 
transparent and accountable to the people of the village. Schemes should be encouraged to 
ensure that the village’s most needy reap the greatest benefits of development. Entrepreneurship 
efforts might also involve a role for the private sector, especially when the scale of business 
exceeds the resources available to a single village. 
In order to encourage ideas for development, relevant ministries, such as the Ministry of Home 
Affairs and Ministry of Villages, Disadvantaged Regions and Transmigration, may accumulate 
a pool of ideas and provide awards to the best solutions to local problems.  This can emulate 
existing competitions such as Kalpataru and Desa Mandiri, among others.
With the limited village treasury lands available, government regulations on village assets 
(including village treasury lands) must move beyond dedicating them to agricultural purposes. 
The government should also focus more on providing skills and entrepreneurship training to 
former agricultural workers to enable them to move out of the sector. The successful examples 
of entrepreneurship in non-agricultural sectors in Beran and Sukoharjo should be treated as 
models to learn from in village asset utilization in particular and village development in general.
The private sector 
also plays a role in the 
economic development 
of the villages through 
the use of village 
treasury lands. It has the 
potential to develop the 
economy in villages that 
lack the required capital, 
both financial and 
human, for initiatives on 
village treasury lands.
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ANNEX
I. Sidomulyo Village
Sidomulyo Village is located in Petanahan Subdistrict. It has an area of 142 ha and is located 
on a low-lying area. The distance between the village and the center of the regency is 9 km. It 
has 982 male inhabitants and 1,036 female inhabitants. The main occupations of the villagers 
are entrepreneurs, agricultural workers and craftsmen (Sidomulyo in Numbers, 2018). It has a 
poverty rate of 6.19% (SMERU, 2013).
II. Bonorowo Village
Bonorowo Village is located about 9 m above sea level and has an area of 134 ha. It is relatively 
distant from the district center, 23.7 km, but is itself a subdistrict center. It has 657 male inhabitants 
and 659 female inhabitants. Most of the villagers work as agricultural workers, employees and 
farm laborers (Bonorowo in Numbers, 2018). The poverty rate of the village is 22.02% (SMERU, 
2013).
III. Tlogojati Village
Tlogojati is a relatively large village, with an area of 586 ha. It is located on hilly land, between 500–
1,000 m above sea level, and is located about 8 km from the district center. It has 1,490 male and 
1,393 female inhabitants, most of whom work as farmers and farm workers (Tlogojati in Numbers, 
2018). This village has a high poverty rate of 46.69% (SMERU, 2013).
IV. Beran Village
Beran Village has an area of 361 ha. It is located 500 m above sea level, and is located about 3 km 
from the subdistrict center in Kepil, but it is located 26 km from the district center. It has 1,992 male 
and 1,999 female inhabitants, most of whom work as farm workers, employees and entrepreneurs 
(Beran in Numbers, 2018). The poverty rate of the village is 21.16% (SMERU, 2013).
V. Sukoharjo Village
Sukoharjo Village has an area of 405 ha. It is located 641 m above sea level, and is a subdistrict 
center located 18 km from the regency center. It has 1,749 male and 1,690 female inhabitants, 
most of whom work as farm workers and farmers (Sukoharjo in Numbers, 2018). The poverty rate 
of the village is 10.64% (SMERU, 2013).
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